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Abstract
We consider a key exchange procedure whose security is based on the difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms in a group, and where exponentiation is hidden by a conjugation. We give a
platform-dependent cryptanalysis of this protocol. Finally, to take full advantage of this procedure,
we propose a group of matrices over a noncommutative ring as platform group.
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1.Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is the first published practical solution to the key
distribution problem, allowing two parties that have never met to exchange a secret key over an open
channel. It uses the cyclic group F∗q, where Fq is the finite field with q elements. The security of this
protocol is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the group F∗q .
There are several algorithms for computing discrete logarithms, some of them are subexponential
when applied to F∗q .
It is important to search for easily implementable groups, for which the DL problem is hard and
there is no subexponential time algorithm for computing DL. The group of points over Fq of an
elliptic curve is such a group.
So keeping in mind the above remarks and the fact that F∗q = GL1(Fq), one can wonder whether
the group GL2(Fq) of two-by-two invertible matrices or more generally the group GLn(Fq), which
admit a“natural” normal form, can be used for a Diffie-Hellman protocol and whether there is some
advantage in using them.
Remark 1.1 Let us fix a matrix X ∈ GLn(Fq). Knowing X and a power X
a, is it easy to find a?
The first point is that knowing X , one can compute det(X) ∈ F∗q (the determinant of X), and also
det(Xa) = (det(X))a. In this way, the DL problem in matrix groups reduces to the DL problem in F∗q.
One can avoid this difficulty by choosing a matrix X such that det(X) = 1, but then by comput-
ing eigenvalues of X and of Xa ( possibly in an extension of the base field), and using the fact that
the latter are the former in the power of a, one reduces once again the DL problem to the one in
some extension of F∗q.
So there is no advantage of considering the DL problem in the group of invertible matrices over
a finite field, and more generally over a finite commutative ring.
We wish to mention that the group of matrices over a finite field as above was first proposed as
a platform group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange in [12], and was cryptanalysed using eigenvalues
and Jordan form in [10]. Note that in this proposition the noncommutative structure of GLn(Fq) is
not used.
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In [2], a protocol using noncommutative (semi) groups in cryptography was proposed. A platform
using braid groups and the same idea was proposed in [9]. Also another platform using matrix algebra
was discussed in [16]. The protocol we use in section 3 is based on the same idea. It uses conjugation
and exponentiation together for its security. A platform for this protocol using braid groups was first
proposed in [14] and another one using an Fq-algebra in [11]. We shall give a cryptanalysis of these
two platforms in section 3, by reducing the problem to the discrete logarithm problem over some
finite field .
The semigroup of matrices over a commutative ring was considered in [8] for an authentication
protocol, but its security is based on the difficulty of the conjugacy search problem and not on the
discrete logarithm one. In fact the authors consider matrices over a somehow complicated ring,
namely the ring of N-truncated polynomials in k variables to make the conjugacy search problem
infeasible.
To avoid the reduction of DL problem to the one over finite fields mentioned in the above remark,
which stems from the special features of (semi)-group matrices over finite fields (namely determinant
and properties of eigenvalues), we can consider matrices over noncommutative finite rings. Group
algebras Fq[G], where G is a noncommutative finite group are examples of such rings. The simplest
example of such group algebras is the group algebra of the group of permutations of three elements,
which is easily implementable. We can then consider two-by-two invertible matrices over such a
group algebra. In the next section, one considers matrix groups over noncommutative rings and
investigate whether the previously mentioned reduction (remark 1.1) in the case of DL problem in
the group matrices over finite fields can happen or not.
2. Quasideterminants, noncommutative determinants, eigenvalues...
Since the invention of quaternions, there has been attempts to define a notion of determinant of
a matrix with noncommutative entries. Here one can mention great names such as Cayley, Study,
Moore, Wedderburn, Heyting and Richardson, Ore, Dieudonne´, Berezin, who all considered such
noncommutative determinants. In most of the cases, these noncommutative determinants are ratio-
nal functions of the entries. The most recent and most general attempt (1991) is due to I. Gelfand
and Retakh. It proved to be very effective in many areas of noncommutative algebra. In what
follows we recall some definitions and results from [4], [5], [6], [7]. See also [15], for a generalization
of Dieudonne´ determinant.
Given a square matrix A of size n, with entries in a noncommutative ring R, we note Aij the
matrix obtained from A by deleting the ith row and the jth column. We also note by rji the ith
row of A with jth position excluded, and by cji the jth column of A with the ith position excluded.
For each position (i, j), the quasideterminant of A is defined by |A|ij := aij − r
j
i (A
ij)−1cji . We have
|A|ij ∈ R and, of course, this quasideterminant exists if the (n−1)-by-(n−1) matrix A
ij is invertible.
So, for a matrix of size n, there are n2 quasideterminants.
Example: n = 2, A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
|A|11 = a11 − a12a
−1
22 a21
|A|12 = a12 − a11a
−1
21 a22
|A|21 = a21 − a22a
−1
12 a11
|A|22 = a22 − a21a
−1
11 a12
Remark 2.1: Even in the commutative case, a quasideterminant is equal not to a determinant,
but to the ratio of two determinants, namely, |A|ij = (−1)
i+j det(A)
det(Aij)
.
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Using quasideterminants, one defines a noncommutative determinant which gives the determinant
(modulo a sign) in the commutative case:
Let I = {i1, i2, ..., in} and J = {j1, j2, ..., jn} be two orderings of the set {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. Note
by Ai1i2...ik,j1j2...jk the matrix obtained from A by deleting the lines i1, i2, ..., ik and the columns
j1, j2, ..., jk. Then one defines the noncommutative determinant of the n-by-n matrix A by:
DI,J(A) := |A|i1,j1|A
i1,j1|i2,j2|A
i1i2,j1j2|i3,j3...|A
i1i2...in−1,j1,j2...jn−1|in,jn.
Example: For a two-by-two matrix A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, we find I = J = {1, 2} and DI,J =
(a11 − a12a
−1
22 a21)a22 = a11a22 − a12a
−1
22 a21a22
Using this noncommutative determinant one can recover some of the previously considered no-
tions such as the Dieudonne´ determinant.
There is still another definition of a noncommutative determinant [4], motivated by representa-
tion theory, and giving the determinant in the commutative case. This noncommutative determinant
is an elementary symmetric function of the noncommutative eigenvalues of A. We do not give this
definition here.
To summarize, there is an active area of noncommutative algebra dealing with noncommutative
determinants, noncommutative eigenvalues, ... From our cryptographic point of view, we only need
to make sure that there is no formula reducing the DL problem in the group of matrices with noncom-
mutative entries to the DL problem in the ring of coefficients. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no way to relate the determinant of a matrix or its eigenvalues to the corresponding determinant
and eigenvalues of a power of this matrix in the noncommutative case.
3. A Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
We consider the following protocol, which is based on the general idea of [2]. The platform pro-
posed in [9] using braid groups is based on the same idea; in the latter case, the security is based
on the conjugacy search problem, whereas in the following, one uses the discrete logarithm and the
conjugacy search problem together.
Suppose G is a noncommutative group and H1 and H2 two subgroups of G such that every element
of H1 commutes with every element of H2.
Here G,H1, H2 and an element X ∈ G of some high order n will be public data. Alice and Bob will
use these data to exchange a key.
Alice selects at random a secret integer a ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1} and a secret element T ∈ H1
(TX 6= XT ); she computes TXaT−1 and sends it to Bob.
Bob selects at random a secret integer b ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1} and a secret element T ′ ∈ H2
(T ′X 6= XT ′); he computes T ′XbT ′−1 and sends it to Alice.
Alice computes (T ′XbT ′−1)a = T ′XabT ′−1; then she conjugates it by her secret element T to
obtain TT ′XabT ′−1T−1.
Bob computes (TXaT−1)b = TXabT−1 and he conjugates it by his secret element T ′ to obtain
T ′TXabT−1T ′−1 which is the same as what Alice obtained due to the commutativity TT ′ = T ′T .
We immediately see that the choice of a matrix group over a finite field (and to some extent over
a commutative ring) as a platform group for this protocol is not a good one. In fact, Remark 1.1 in
the introduction about the reduction of the DL problem from matrix groups to the same problem
over some extension of the base field remains valid. Let λ be an eigenvalue of TXaT−1. One has
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det(TXaT−1 − λid) = 0, so det(T (Xa − λid)T−1) = 0. Then, by the multiplicative property of
determinant, we get det(Xa− λid) = 0 and λ is an eigenvalue of Xa and is equal to some eigenvalue
of X to the power a.
So choosing a matrix group over a finite field as a platform group offers no advantage. Furthermore,
taking the underlying multiplicative group of an algebra as platform group does not provide any
advantage either, as using representation theory one can reduce the problem to the one over matrices
and then to the discrete logarithm over some finite field.
This protocol was first used in [14] in the context of braid groups. In the paper the authors
consider a modified irreducible Burau type representation of a braid group and apply this protocol
at the representation level to the matrices over some finite field. By what we said previously this is
not a good choice and can be reduced to the DL problem over some extension of the field.
The same protocol was used in [11], by taking as the platform group the multiplicative group of a
noncommutative algebra of dimension four over a finite field. By taking the regular representation of
this algebra we can transfer the scheme to the level of matrices and then reduce it to the DL problem
in some extension of the finite field.
In [13] this protocol is implemented as a software for smartphones using (5× 5) matrix groups over
a finite field, and its performance is compared to other implementations using finite fields or elliptic
curves. The result of this comparison is that this protocol is largely more performant than those
using finite fields or elliptic curves. As mentioned before, due to the reduction to the case of discrete
logarithm over a finite field, the performance of this protocol using matrix groups over a finite field
must not be so different from the one over a finite field.
So, to take the best advantage of this protocol, we propose to choose as a platform group the group
of matrices over a noncommutative rings, namely we consider two by two matrices over the group
algebra of the symetric group S3, which we denote by G = GL2(Fq[S3]) where S3 is the group of
permutations of three elements. Here X will be an element of GL2(Fq[S3]) and we fix
H = H1 = H2 =
{(
x y
y x
)
∈ GL2(Fq) | x ∈ Fq, y ∈ Fq, x
2 − y2 6= 0
}
,
which is a commutative subgroup of GL2(Fq[S3]). In fact H is a maximal torus of GL2(Fq).
3.1 ElGamal encryption
Suppose that Alice is the owner of the public key data, GL2(Fq[G]), X ∈ GL2(Fq[G]) of order n
and H = H1 = H2 as above. Suppose also that Alice has selected a secret integer a and a secret
matrix T ∈ H , and made TXaT−1 public. Bob can encrypt a message M intended for Alice, as
follows:
Bob selects a random integer b ∈ {2, 3, .., n− 2}, and a matrix T ′ ∈ H ;
he computes TT ′XabT−1T ′−1 as explained in the precedent section.
Bob determines a symmetric encryption key t based on TT ′XabT−1T ′−1 (in a way he agreed upon
with Alice).
Bob uses an agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key t to encrypt M , resulting in the
encryption E.
Bob sends (T ′XbT ′−1, E) to Alice.
Receiving these data, Alice computes TT ′XabT−1T ′−1, as in the previous section; she derives from
this the symmetric encryption key t; she uses the agreed upon symmetric encryption method with
key t to decrypt E, and finds M .
Remark 3.1.1 The ElGamal encryption as explained above is an hybrid version of ElGamal’s
encryption. In the textbook ElGamal encryption, we can take the message M ∈ GL2(Fq[G]):
Bob sends to Alice (T ′XbT ′−1, TT ′XabT−1T ′−1M).
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Alice computes (TT ′XabT−1T ′−1)−1 and by multiplying at the left with the second data, she findsM .
See also [1].
4. Choice of parameters and security
Owing to the similarity between the protocol we use and the one proposed in the context of braid
groups [9], one may ask if the same kind of attacks as in the braid groups can be applied in our context.
We remind that the security of braid-based cryptography relies on the difficulty of the conjugacy
search problem. The problem is as follows: Knowing an element X and a conjugate TXT−1, is it
easy to find T ? In other words, we know an element and some conjugate of it and one tries to find a
conjugating element T . One of the main attacks against these procedures is to search T not in the
whole conjugacy class of X , but in some characteristic part of it. The second kind of attack is to use
some probabilistic research in the conjugacy class of X . The third one is to use linear representations
of braid groups to reduce the problem to the one in a matrix group, which is easy to solve. See [3]
for details.
The main difference between our approach and those using braid groups is that, in our case, X
is publicly known, but the conjugacy class which is involved is that of Xa, which is not known, so
all the above attacks are useless in our case.
As we mentioned before (section 2), specific features of the group of invertible matrices with
noncommutative entries cannot be used to attack our protocol.
As for the existing algorithms computing discret logarithms, such as “Baby Step, Giant Step”, or
the Pollard rho algorithm, they cannot be applied directly and without modification to our protocol,
because in these algorithms one is supposed to know an element and some power of it; in our case
X ∈ G is known but Xa is hidden due to the conjugation by a secret matrix T .
Algorithm 4.1 We propose the following algorithm (an adaptation of the Baby Step Giant Step
algorithm) for computing the secret keys. Let n be the order of X . So knowing X and Y = TXaT−1,
we want to compute the secret keys a , T and the exchanged key TT ′XabT ′−1T−1.
1) For k = 1 to n compute Xk, and put the sorted result in a table.
2) For x, y ∈ Fq such that x
2−y2 6= 0 put Tx,y =
(
x y
y x
)
; then compute Tx,yY T
−1
x,y , and compare
it to the table of step (1).
3) If, for some k0 and some Tx0,y0, one has Tx0,y0Y T
−1
x0,y0
= Xk0, then stop step (2); a = k0 and
T = T−1x0,y0 being known, compute (T
′XbT ′−1)a and conjugate it by T−1x0,y0 to obtain the exchanged
secret key.
As for the complexity of Algorithm 4.1, we have O(n) group operations in the first step. Then,
in the second step, we have O(q2) group operations and O(nln(n)) comparaisons. So, assuming that
a comparaison is much faster than a group operation, we conclude that altogether the algorithmic
cost is O(max(n, q2)).
Taking into account the above values, we propose to take |Fq| ≃ 2
40 and the matrixX ofGL2(Fq[S3]
to be of order ≥ 280.
We propose to generate the invertible matrices X as follows. First, we observe that every
matrix
(
a c
0 b
)
with a and b invertible in Fq[S3] and no condition on c is invertible, with in-
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verse
(
a−1 −a−1cb−1
0 b−1
)
. Also every matrix
(
a 0
c b
)
satisfying the same conditions is invert-
ible, with inverse
(
a−1 0
−b−1ca−1 b−1
)
. Then, we can see that every matrix of the form X =(
u b
c 1 + cu−1b
)
with u invertible in Fq[S3]) and no condition on b, c is invertible as well. In-
deed, we observe that PXQ = Id where P and Q are the invertible matrices P =
(
1 0
−cu−1 1
)
and Q =
(
u−1 −u−1b
0 1
)
, leading to X−1 =
(
u−1 + u−1bcu−1 −u−1b
−cu−1 1
)
. By multiplying invert-
ible matrices of the types above, one can obtain a number of invertible matrices.
We now determine |GL2(Fq[S3])|, which is helpful for computing the order of elements.
Lemma 4.1.1: Suppose the characteristic of Fq is not 2 or 3, so that Fq[S3] is a semisimple
algebra. Then |GL2(Fq[S3])| = q
8(q − 1)8(q + 1)4(q2 + 1)(q2 + q + 1).
Proof. Using the linear representations of the symmetric group S3 and of the group alge-
bra Fq[S3], namely the fact that S3 has three irreducible representations, two of dimension one
and the third of dimension two, one can write Fq[S3] ≃ Fq ⊕ Fq ⊕ Mat2(Fq) (Wedderburn theo-
rem). Then we find Mat2(Fq[S3]) ≃ Mat2(Fq) ⊕Mat2(Fq) ⊕Mat2(Mat2(Fq)), and GL2(Fq[S3]) ≃
GL2((Fq)⊕GL2(Fq)⊕GL4(Fq), whence |GL2(Fq[S3])| = [q(q−1)
2(q+1)]2(q4−1)(q4−q)q4−q2)(q4−q3),
and |GL2(Fq[S3])| = q
8(q − 1)8(q + 1)4(q2 + 1)(q2 + q + 1).
5. Conclusion
Matrix groups admit a natural normal form, making them easy to use for cryptography. Over
finite fields special properties of matrix groups such as determinant and eigenvalues can be used to
develop attacks against the protocol investigated in this paper. So, in any cryptographic protocol
using matrix groups, one has first to verify that the above properties cannot be used to defeat the
system. By using matrix groups over a noncommutative ring such as the group algebra of a finite
group (for instance Fq[Sn]), we can avoid such attacks.
We thank the referee for informing us of some references.
References
[1] D. Boneh, A. Joux, Phong Q. Nguyen, Why textbook Elgamal and RSA encryption are inse-
cure, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 1976 (2000), 30-44
[2] M.A. Cherepnev, V.M. Sidelnikov, V.V. Yashchenko, Systems of open distribution of keys on
the basis of noncommutative semigroups, Russian Acad. Sci. Dokl. Math. 48 (1994), no. 2, 384-386.
[3] P. Dehornoy, Braid-based cryptography, Contemporary Mathematics, 360 (2004), 5-33.
[4] I. Gelfand, D. Krob, A. Lascoux, B. Leclerc, V. Retakh, J-Y. Thibon, Noncommutative sym-
metric functions, Advances in Math. 112 (1995), no. 2, 218-348.
[5] I. Gelfand, V. Retakh, Determinants of matrices over noncommutative rings, Funct. Anal.
Appl., 25 (1991),no. 2, 91-102.
6
[6] I.Gelfand, V. Retakh, Quasideterminants 1, Selecta Math. (N.S.) 3 (1997), no. 4, 517-546.
[7] I. Gelfand, S. Gelfand, V. Retakh, R. Wilson, Quasideterminants, Advances in Math., 193
(2005), 56-141.
[8] D. Grigoriev, V. Shpilrain, Authentication from matrix conjugation, Groups, Complexity,
Cryptology, 2009, Vol. 1, 199-205.
[9] K.H. Ko, S.J. Lee, J.H. Cheon, J.W. Han, J. Kang, C. Park, New public-key cryptosystem
using braid groups, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1880 (2000), 166-183.
[10] Menezes A.J., Wu Yi-H. The discrete logarithm problem in GLn(Fq); ARS Combinatorica.
47 (1997), 23-32.
[11] D.N. Moldovyan, N.A. Moldovyan, A new hard problem over noncommutative finite groups
for cryptographic protocols, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6258 (2010), 183-194.
[12] R.Odonne, D. Varadharajan, P. Sanders, Public key distribution in matrix rings, Electronic
Letters, 20 (1984), 386-387.
[13] V. Ottaviani, A. Zanoni, M. Regoli, Conjugation as public key agreement protocol in mobile
cryptography, SECRYPT, Sci. Te. Press (2010), 411-416.
[14] E. Sakalauskas, P. Tvarijonas, A. Raulynaitis, Key agreement protocol using conjugacy and
discrete logarithm problems in group representation level, Informatica, 18 (2007) ,no 1, 115-124.
[15] V. Shpilrain, Noncommutative determinants and automorphisms of groups, Comm. Algebra
25 (1997), 559-574.
[16] Soojin Cho, Kil Chan Ha, Young-One Kim, Dongho Moon, Key exchange protocol using
matrix algebras and its analysis, Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society, 42/6 (2005), 1287-
1308.
7
